Comparative Study of the Foundations of Resistance in Islamic Sharia and Contemporary International Law

This article aims to conduct a comparative study of the foundations of the legitimacy of resistance in the Holy Quran, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and contemporary international law. The main research question is on what basis resistance is recognized as legitimate in each of these two theoretical systems, and what their points of convergence and divergence are. The primary focus in the Islamic section is on defensive jihad, while in the international law section it is on the right to self-determination and legitimate defense. The research method is analytical-comparative and relies on the examination of Quranic verses, the opinions of Shia and Sunni jurists, and international instruments. In the first step, the concept of resistance is examined from lexical and terminological perspectives, and two minimal and maximal meanings are presented. In its minimal sense, resistance refers to legitimate defense against aggression. In its maximal sense, it also encompasses cultural, economic, and political dimensions. This article focuses on the minimal meaning—that is, military defense against occupation and aggression—and analyzes its religious and legal foundations. In the Quranic section, the following foundations are examined: First, the defense of the oppressed (mustaḍʿafīn), which is presented in Verse 75 of Surah An-Nisa as a divine obligation and makes fighting to save the oppressed a duty. Second, the divine permission for defensive jihad in Verse 39 of Surah Al-Hajj, which ties the legitimacy of fighting to the occurrence of oppression and aggression. Third, the principle of negating foreign domination, derived from Verse 141 of Surah An-Nisa, which has been transformed in fiqh into the rule of Nafy al-Sabīl (negation of the way [for domination]). Fourth, the necessity of patience and constant vigilance, which portrays resistance as a continuous process requiring permanent preparedness. In addition to these foundations, the Quran also establishes a clear ethical framework, including the principle of non-aggression and the prohibition of killing innocents, which form the basis of the rules
of war in Islam. Next, the status of resistance in Islamic jurisprudence is examined. Although the term “resistance” is not used in classical fiqh works, there is a consensus among Islamic schools of thought on the obligation of defensive jihad. Islamic fiqh has established specific rules for this defense, including the prohibition of attacking non-combatants, observance of proportionality, fidelity to covenants, and avoidance of indiscriminate destruction. In the section on contemporary international law, the article shows that although the principle of the prohibition of the use of force was established after the World Wars, international instruments have recognized certain exceptions. Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the right of states to self-defense in the event
of an armed attack. Additionally, UN General Assembly resolutions, especially the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations (Resolution 2625) and certain resolutions related to anti-colonial struggles, have affirmed the legitimacy of peoples’ struggles for liberation from colonialism and foreign occupation. However, this legitimacy is conditional upon compliance with international humanitarian law, including the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and the principle of proportionality. The distinction between legitimate resistance and terrorist acts is also made on this basis. In the comparative section, the article identifies three main areas of convergence: first, acceptance of the principle of defense against aggression; second, emphasis on observing ethical and humanitarian standards during resistance; and third, the common goal of liberation from domination and the realization of a form of independence. In contrast, there are also significant differences: First, the difference in the source of legitimacy—in Islam, legitimacy derives from divine revelation, whereas in international law it is based on the will of states and international agreements. Second, the difference in the nature of resistance—in Islamic fiqh, resistance is a religious duty and sometimes an individual obligation (wājib ʿaynī), while in international law it is a right that may be exercised or waived. Third, the difference in the ultimate objective—in Islam, the goal is the realization of divine justice and the victory of the faith, whereas in international law the primary objective is the preservation of territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Fourth, the difference in enforcement mechanisms—in international law, institutions such as the Security Council have a supervisory role, but their performance faces political challenges. In conclusion, the study finds that despite fundamental differences, there is a degree of practical convergence between the two approaches regarding defense against occupation and adherence to humanitarian principles. This potential can serve as a basis for developing a comprehensive ethical-legal framework to support legitimate resistance and protect the rights of oppressed nations.